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ABSTRACT
The paper constructs and analyzes a simple cohort model of
the Hungarian pension syatem (cf. Auqusztinovics, 1992),
with a particular emphasis on the role of indexation.
Neglecting a couple oP important demographic relations and
heterogeneity within cohorts, we concentrate on differences
amonq cohorts. The gradual depreciation of any cohort's
pension is explained by the partial indexation of pensions
to waqes. Full indexation at a lower replacement rate could
improve the welfare of the pensioners with relatively
little social cost.2
1. INTRODUCTIONI
A serious contradiction characterized the Hunqarian pension
system in the socialist era: While the averaqe pensiona
have increased much faster than the averaqe wages (and
prices), the bulk of the pensioners has suffered from
declining pensions (the paradox of the pensions). Durinq
the years of fast qrowth and low inflation the decline was
only relative (relative to waqes), in the years of
stagnation and depression the decline became real (relative
to prices). In a recent paper Augusztinovics (1992) has
analyzed the social security crisis in Hunqary. Relying on
her work, I shall develop a cohort model of a pay-as-you-qo
pension system. Its basic ingredients will be as follows:
(i) Waqes of all (younq) cohorts qrow at a uniform
rate. (ii) Employers and employees contribute a qiven share
(contribution rate) of the corresponding net waqe to a
pension fund. (iii) The entry pension is a qiven share
(replacement rate) of the closing waqe. (iv) Pensions of
1 Research was financed by the Dutch National Science
Foundation (NWO) and the Center for Economic Research at
Tilburg University. I express my intellectual indebtedness
to MSria Auqusztinovics whose work stirred my interest in
cohort modela. Help by Jórq Glombowski, Béla Martos,
Eduardo Siandra, Harrfe Verbon, an anonymous referee and by
the participants of the Seminar at University Bonn, Dieter
Bós in particular, is also acknowledged. The usual
disclaimer applies.3
all (old) year qroups2 grow at a uniform rate, whích ia
lower than the wage qrowth rate. If the relative (or the
real) pension of a year group fell below a minimum value,
then it would be raised to that minimum. (v) The pension
system is balanced. Note that the qiven rates can change in
time.
in our model for realistic parameter values the
contribution rate of 32á and the relative pension of 70t
would produce a budget deficit 3.9t with respect to the
GDP. Rather than modifying contribution and replacement
rates and maintaining relative pensions, the government has
sticked to the prevailinq contribution and replacement
rates and widened the wage-pension scissors to debase
penaioas. The above-mentioned paradox has been accentuated
by secularly increasing replacement rates which resulted
from increasing years of service acknowledged by the
qovernment.
The models of optimal pension eystems sugqest constant
relative pensions and uniform pension profile, i.e. full
indexation accordinq to waqe, asauminq that (i) there are
only two generations and no cohorts (Verbon, 1988) or (ii)
growth and interest rates are time-invariant (Siandra and
Simonovits (1992), Simonovits (1992b and no discount)).
Apart from theoretical results, proportionality
between pensions and wages (or prices) is particularly
important in the Hungarian situation. (i) There have not
been and there are still no capital markets (real rate of
interest have been negative for a lonq time) and (ii) most
2 I shall use the expression yaar group in
longitudinal meaning and coIIort in cross-sectional meaning.
To give two examples: For example, we shall say that the
pension of the year group of people born in 1920 increased
by 4á in 1981 and the entry pension of the cohort of just
retired people aged 53 years was higher by 6~ in 1981 than
in the entry pension of the corresponding cohort was in
1980.4
of the pensioners are poor and cannot much substitute
intertemporally. Moreover, I do not arque for a
redistribution between the young and the old, I only
propose a redistribution lrom younqer pensioners to older
pensioners.3
I would like to emphasize that the model is quite
simple. Concentratinq on the flows of the pay-as-you-qo
system, I do not deal with problems connected with stocks
(like private savings or public debt), thus interest rates
and present values are iqnored (Augusztinovics (1989),
(1991), (1992) and Bod (1992)). Similarly, I shall neglect
the problem created by the different demographic and
economic characteristics of inen and women4 (see Bod, 1992).
Finally, most of the variables (like birth rate, retirement
age and inflation rate) are taken as qiven rather than
determined by the system. Studyinq the influence of
inflation and indexation on the pension system, these
simplifications seem to be acceptable.
In contrast to the scarcity of Eastern sources, the
Western literature on pension systema is enormous.
Reflecting the US dominance in economics, most of the
papers concentrate on the US (e.q. Thompson (1983) and Hurd
(1990)). However, the Hungarian public finance system has
been and probably will be much closer to the Western
European systems, therefore Weat European sources ought to
be consulted as well (e.q. Verbon (1988), B6s and von
Weizsacker (1989) and Johnson et al. (1989)).
3 A similar amoothing of real flows of mortgaqe
payments was analyzed, among others, by Modigliani (1976)
and Simonovits (1992a). Lovell (1981) even combined indexed
mortqages and indexed pensions.
4 In Hungary men die much earlier than women, althouqh
the former retire five years later than the latter. A widow
can chose between her own pension or half of her deceased
husband's.5
The main topic of the paper is indexation of pensiona.
Althouqh indexation in qeneral is alao a much-debated field
(e.q. Fisher (1986)), relatively few papers concentrate on
indexation of pensions (e.q. Kaplan (1977) and Thompson
(1979)).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2
outlines the basic model of overlappinq qenerations with
special emphasis on pensions (see also Marchand and
Pestieau, 1991). Formalizinq Auqusztinovics (1992), Section
3 introduces cohorts to shed liqht on inequalities amonq
newer and older pensions. Building on a very primitive
(temporary) data base, Section 4 displays the results of
simulations. Finally, Section 5 draws the conclusions.
2. GENERATIONS AND PENSION
In this section we shall outline the basic model of public
pensions, following Marchand and Pestieau (1991). Time unit
is a year. Note that in qenuine Overlapping Generation
(OLG) Models (pioneered by Allais (1947) and Samuelson
(1958)) the unit of time is 25-30 years to ensure that the
younq qeneration of period t forms the old generation of
period tfl. Practical studies (like Marchand and Pestieau,
1991) have to dispense with that simplifyinq assumption and
return to years. In this case, of course, there is an
annual change in the memberships of both generations.
We first introduce the followinq
Demographic variabl~a
Nty-number of wage-earnera (basically young),
Nt-number of pensioners (basically old),
and6
Economic variablea
Wt-average wage (and salary)5,
Zt-averaqe unit total waqe cost,
Btsaverage pension (benefit),
et-average contribution rate (per wage),
~t-average income tax and health contribution rate
(per wage),
ct-relative pension (per wage).
pay-as-you-qo system
The essence of a pure pay-as-you-go pension system is that
the pensions in a given year are financed by contributions
of employers and employees paid in the same (rather than
from earlier) year(s). (In fact, transfers from trust funds
and government revenues may make up the losses of the
pension budget.) We can express the pension from the




Total unit wage cost is equal to (net) wage plus social
security contribution (6tWt) plus health contribution and
income tax (EtWt):
(2.2) Zt-:(1tAtfit)Wt
The relative pension is equal to the ratio of pensions to
waqesó:
5 Without stressing it, we shall work with net rather
than gross wage, since the income tax system was only
introduced at the end of the forgoing period, in 1988. We
also exclude social contributions from our wage category,
since in Hungary only a small part (less than 20t) is
financed by the employee.
6 Note that in Hungary pensioners do not pay income
taxes after theiz pensions.7
Bt
(2.3) cte:W~.





Then the balancing contribution rate is
(2.5) At,~~ctát-
Here the balancing contribution rate ia a homogeneous
linear function of the relative pension: qiven the
demographic parameter 6t, hiqher relative pension implies
proportionally higher contribution rate.
3. COHORTS, INDEXATION AND PENSIONS
In this Section we shall create a simple cohort model which
accounts for the inter-cohort inhomogeneity of pensions.
The basic idea is the following: In Hungary the replacement
rate ia only applied to the new pension while old pensions
are indexed at a quite modest rate. Since pension has been
lagging behind wage and the replacement rate has been
increasinq, the scissors of new and old pensions are always
widening until the floor of minimum pension halts the
process (Augusztinovics, 1992, p. 17).
To simplify the analysis, we shall apply the following
assumption.
Cohort uniformity. Every young person works from the
aqe of Ltl and retires at R, after working for U-R-L
years7. Nobody lives lonqer than D years, getting pensíon
for at most VSD-R years.
7 Note that here we explicitly identify workers with
the young and pensioners with the old in order to avoid the
issue who finances the pensions of non-working persons.8
We ahall need the followinq
Disaqqraqated demoqraphio variables
Nt~~number of people of aqe x in year t,
Nty~E15u5U Nt,I.tu~number of people workinq (young),
Nt~E15VSV Nt,Rfv~number of people retired (old).
If we want to avoid demoqraphic complication caused by
chanqing aqe structure of the population (cf also Bós and
Weizsacker (1989)), we muat make the followinq assumption.
A1. 8tationarp populatioa. (i) Each year the number of
people in cohort x is equal to qxNt-x~0 where qx is a non-
increasing sequence: 1~q12q22..2qps0. (ii) Each year the
same number of people (N) are born.
We next introduce the followinq
Disaqqreqated eaonomio variables
Wt~zaveraqe closinq vage, earned by the oldest workinq
cohort ,
~t-replaoamsnt rate (connectinq entry penaion to
closinq wage),
Bt ~zaveraqe pension in vth year of retirement
(retired cohort v), v~1,2,...,V.
7~veraqe pension
The following relation holds between cohort and average
pensions:
(3.1) BtadtióE15v5V PRtv Bt,Rtv~ where Pk~qk-qk-1.
waqe and pension indezation
We assume that the ratio of the closinq Maqa to the averaqe
vaqe is time-invariant, i.e. there exista a positive
constant ~ such that
(3.2) Wt~-~Wt.
We assume that the average wage grows at a qiven rate IIt-1:
(3.3) WtaQtWt, tlt~l.9
As a consequence, the closinq waqa qrows at the givan rate
f2t-1:
(3.a) wt.~ntwt-1'~ nt~i.
We have first to define the pansion dynamica !or the
initial years. The entry pension is a qiven share o! the
closinq waqe paid last year:
(3.5) Bt,l~l~twt-1~~ Ot~t~1.8
We also asaume that the pension o! each old year group
grows at a uniform rate pt-1 unless it fell below a qiven
(time-variant) minimum level Btm:
(3.6) Bt~~max(~tst-l,v-l~Btm)~ v-2,3,..,V.
Dpnaaias
We shall refer to the ratio it of pension qrowth factor to
waqe qrowth factor as the r~lativ~ p~nsion qrorth faotor or
for short, zolativ~ pension in3~z and the v-aumulatoá
r~lativ~ p~nsion iaQez ft,v:
Rt
(3.7) it~:n~ and it,v~:~t~t-i...it-vf1.
By using the indexation rulas (3.2)-(3.6) and the relative




8 Note the difference between this cohort-specific and
lagqed replacement rate and the relative pension of Section
2. A decent pension aystem would index the reference wage
either by Bt or ,S~t. Note also that in practice the
reference waqe is not equal to the last year's wage but to
an averaqe oP the waqes of several (three to five) closinq
years. As Augusztinovics (1992) underlined, under fast waqe
growth the distributed laqs diminished the effective
replacement values.10
?ull indazatioa
Althouqh full indexation (~t-1) has never prevailed in
Hunqary, its analysis is interesting: (i) Full indaxation
characterizes most Western pension systems and should also
be introduced in Hunqary; (ii) full indexation is a usalul
benchmark for analyzing partial indexation.
To eliminate irrelevant cases, we make the followinq
assumption.
A2. The minimum pansion is amaller than the entry
pension:
(3.9) Btm~{~tWt-1~.
We can now state a cross-sectional observation:
Proposition 1. If the cohort penaions above the
minimum were fully indexed to waqes (it-1), and the
contribution and the raplacement rates were constant (Ats9
and ptsp), then all cohort pensions would ba the same:
(3.10) Bt,v~~tWt-1~. vm1,2,...,V.
Proof. By (3.7), ft~~l, and ut being constant, (3.8)
reduces to (3.10).
If we want to get rid of the disturbanca caused by the
laq in the replacement equation (3.5), we shall need the
followinq assumption.
A3. The wage qrowth factor ia time-invariant:
( 3 .11) f2t~t1.
We have now
Propositioa 2. if, in addition to the conditions of
Proposition 1, assumption A3 were added, then relative
cohort pensions would also be constant (both cross-
sectionally and lonqitudinally) and qiven by
(3.12) Ct,~y~~~, ta1,2,... and Va1,2,...,V,
n
while the balancinq contribution rate would simply be
(3.13) Af-n~.11





gy (3.g), Bt~~-~~w~[1, implying conatant ct,v's.
Q.E.D.
Havinq finished the analysis of full indexation, we
turn to the case of partial indexation, responsible for
many distortions of the pension system. Before discussinq
partial indexation, it will be helpful to introduce prices,
real variablea and consider the dynamics of the replacement
ratios.
inllation
Let xt and Pt denote the inflation factor and the price
level in year t, respectively. Then
(3.15) Pt~:xtPt-1.
The real variables to be used are the followinq:
(3.16) wta:P~, bta:Pt and bt~~~: p~V.
(Lower-case Roman letter stands for a real value of the
nominal variable denoted by the corresponding upper-case
Roman letter.)
inareasinq replacement ratio
An important feature of the development of the Hunqarian
(and other) pension system(s) is that in the beginninq (in
the fifties) the replacement rate was quite low and it has
been increasing since then. The reason was quite simple:
The closer we are to the present, the larger the legally
acknowledged average years of service of the oldest12
younq cohort, implying a larger replacement rate
(Augusztinovics, 1992, p. 12),9,10
A4. The replacement rate i s qrowing:
(3.17) {tt~~ttl-
Although in the model the contribution rate ia
endoqenoualy determined, it is of certain interest how thin
was the veil coverinq the needed increase in the
contribution rate: that rate was made an increasinq
function of nomiaal wage, thus riainq nominal wages
automatically raised it.
Bartial indesation
First we shall consider the relation of pension increases
to wage increases. We shall make the followinq assumption.
A5. The cohort pensions above minimum qrow more slowly
than wagea:
(3.18) ~t~tlt, i.e. ~~1.
We now formulate a croas-sectional statement:
Proposition 3. If the replacement rate i s increasing
[(3.17)] and there is a partial pension indexation
[(3.18)], then at any given time the older the cohort, the
lower is its pension unless it is minimal:
(3.19) Bt,vtl~Bt,v, 1f Bt,v~Btm~
(3.20) St,ytlaBt,v, if Bt~~-Btm.
9 It is to be underlined that there is a contradiction
between the insurance principle ( replacement rate depending
on years of service) and the taxation prínciple (pay-ae-
you-go pension system). Verbon ( 1988) demonstrates that
this contradiction has always characterized the Western
systems as well.
10 in fact, during the last yeara the replacement
ratio siqnificantly diminished: (i) The linear rule was
replaced by a concave piecewise linear function and (ii)
the dramatically accelerating inflation has excluded a
larqe part of the real wages earned in the reference years
from the reference wage (Augusztinovics, 1992, pp. 13-14).13
Brool. (3.8) yields
~t-v
Bt vtl~max(àt-v------Bt ~, Btm)
' ~t-vtl '
Since 1~t-v~~t-vtl and Ot-~~1, the first expresaion in the
maximum is less than Bt~y. If Bt~~~Btm, then ( 3.19) is
proved. If Bt~~~Btm then Bt~~tl~Btm, ( 3.20) is proved.
Remark 1. Recently the government tried to refine
indexation in the following way: the older the pensioner,
or the earlier retired, the larqer the increase.ii
Semark 2. in Hunqary wages qrew faster than prices in
the seventies, while prices overtook wages in the eighties.
Nominal year group pension dynamics always lagqed behind
pricea and waqe dynamics. It seems to be rather obvious
that pensions should be indexed by (net) wages, more or
less stabilizing the relative pensions.
On th~ pension paradoz
But to understand the dynamics of real pensions of year
groups, we should also consider the real pension index. We




and the followinq assumptions.
A6. The year groups' pensions (above the minimum) grow
more slowly than prices:
11 In addition to cohort-apecific measurea, the
indexation was often degressive: the higher the pension,
the smaller the (absolute or relative) increase. Note,
however, that this sophistication has not prevented the
absurd situation of pension reversions: it has quite
frequently occurred that person A had larger pension than
person B in one year just to have the reverse order in the
next year. worst of all, the system changes every year
siqnificantly and unpredictably.14
(3-22) Bt~xt, i.e. et~l.
A7. The minimum real pension is time-invariant:
( 3 . 2 3 ) bt~bm .
Propoaition 4. If year groupe' pensions (above the
minimum) qrow slower than prícea [(3.22)], then tha oldar
the year qroup, the lower is its real pension unless it is
minimal:
(3.24) bt,v~bt-l,v-1. if bt-l,v-l~bm:
(3.25) bt,v-bt-l,v-1~ if bt-l,v-lzbm~





(3.21) and ( 3.23) yield bm~bt,v~bt-l,v-1-
Suppose that bt~~-bm. If bt-l,v-l~bm, then (3.24)
holds; if bt-l,v-l~bm, then ( 3.25) holds.
Until now we have said nothinq about the relation of
the average penaion to the average net wage. This relation
is quite complex. It depends on the cohort structure of
waqes and pensions.





This averaqe can increase if the replacement rate
increases fast enough, even if real cohort pensions
diminish [(3.21) and (3.24)].
As a result, the followinq paradox has been present
for decades: while the average pensions have increased much
faster than average waqes (and prices), the bulk of the
pensioners has experienced declininq relative (and real)
pensions.15
Aadistributioa o! pensions
The difference between relative and real fall in pensions
becomea important, when the minimum pension hits the
poverty line. The qovernment miqht remain passive when only
the relative value of the cohort~year qroup pensions
declined. However, when the real waqes atarted to diminish,
older cohort pension fell dramatically, quite often below
the poverty line (Augusztinovics 1992, p. 15). Thfa
required a government intervention. To contain mass
poverty, the purchasing power oP minimum penaions has been
maintained, leadinq to a sharp drop in the dispersion of
inter-cohort (and intra-cohort) pensions. One might say
that there was a redietribution from high pensions to low
pensions.
Bod (1992) argues for the abolition (or reduction) of
cross-subsidizfnq 'social' pensions from 'labor' pensions.
This ia also in the center of the US discussion, as
Thompson (1983) puts it, social adequacy vs. individual
equity. Perhapa the best solution is to introduce a two-
part pension system, with 'social' and 'labor' pensions.
Social pension should replace the present minimum pension
and labor pension should depend on the total real wage of
the pensioner. The total pension should be the either sum
or the maximum of the social and labor pension (see the
Netherlands).
Tranaitioaal period
It ehould be mentioned that we have implicitly assumed that
the system was started so lonq ago that every year qroups'
new pension develops according to (3.8). what happens,
however, during a transitional period?
Suppose the system was introduced in year 0(say, in
1950) and we are studyinq the period till year V(say,
before 1987:) Then we have to take B0,1~ B0,2~.-..BO,V as




our formulas are so cumbersome that it will be helpful to
evaluate them numerically. Since this work is theoretical,
which leaves out many important details, it will suffice to
consider the simplest setup which still reflects the ts
relevant properties of the system. (Auqusztinovics (1992)
applied an even simpler framework to illustrate her
messaqe.)
Following the structure of Sectiona 2 and 3, we shall
first simulate generations, then cohorts.
4.1. SIMULATION OF GENERATIONS
To get a feeling for the orders of magnitudes, we begin
with a highly stylized Hungarian numerical example with
time-invariant characteristics. Taking 6~0.551 from
Subsection 4.2 below and usinq (2.5) we are able to
quantify the connection between 9 and c.
In Nunqary all the contributions are determined in
terms of qross waqe: employer and employee's contribution
rates are 0.1 and 0.44, respectively, both divided between
pension and health in proportion 44:56. The average income
tax rate is about 0.15. It would be logical to start from
total waqe cost and determine the contribution rates w.r.t.
it (Augusztinovics (1992) and Western practice). To
simplify the analysis, we have started from the net waqe
and built up gross wage and total wage cost. In this way
the pension contribution rate Aa0.32 and the sum of the
health contribution rate (0.4) and the income tax rate
(0.2) is ~s0.6. Let us pretend that the relative pension is
around 0.66. Then the correspondinq balancinq values are as
high as et~0.364 or as low as c~a0.56, respectively.17
This leads us to Fiqure 1, whera we chanqe the
relative pension from 0.5 to 0.7 and observe that the
balancinq contribution rate increases from 0.276 to 0.386.
4.2. SIMULATION OF COHORTS
Turning from qenerations to cohorts, we have to provide
Daaoqraphiaal developments
We shall assume stationarity (A1). As a further
simplification, we stipulate the followinq:
Nobody dies before 40 years. The oonditional death
rate rk is exponentially increasing in time after aqe 40:
(4.1a) rk~0 for i5k540
and
(4.1b) rk-hleh(k-40) for 415k590,
where h1-0.003 and h~0.0921;
( 4 . 2) ~~1c391c-1(1-rk) ,
We shall work with I~19, RL53 and Dv90.12 As a result,
the young and the old generations conaist of UaR-Ir34 and
V~D-R-37 cohorts, respectively; 6-0.551.
7lvaraqe vs alosinq vaqe




Considerinq indexation, we shall distinguish between
relative and real quantities and neglect nominal
quantfties. Usinq the relative pension index, it will be
convenient to change it in the interval [0.9,1] .(Since a
12 I tried to approximate the Hungarian life tables as
closely and as simply as possible. I had no data on the
averaqe ages of entry to and exit from the labor force,
therefore I chose them to qet intuitive results.F i gure ~






0.25 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
Relative pension18
nominal index like ~ cannot be lower than one, low relative
pension index is meant as hfgh wage indexation and probably
high inflation rather than contracting nominal pensions.)
If pensions were fully indexed and the replacement
ratio 0.75 were adhered to, then the contribution rate
should be raised to as hiqh as 0.431 from the present o.32.
On the other hand, the present contribution and replacement
rates are consistent for a relative index 4~0.97 (Figure
2).
Dynamia,
Until now we have concentrated on the effects of varying
some parameter values (contribution rate or relative
pension index), fn a given year. Now we introduce genuine
dynamics, too, but with a fixed relative pension index:
(4.4) át~0.97.
We set out from the following scenario: each year the
wages increase by 6~, while the inflation rate increases by
0.4á a year, starting from 2~, i.e.
(4.5) f2t-1.06
and
(4.6) rt-rt,0}rrt, where xt~0-1.02 and rr-0.004.
Correspondinq to the Hungarian developments, this
implies a 20á increase and drop in real wages in the
seventies and the eiqhties, respectively.
In accordance with the Hungarian pension system we
shall work with markedly increased replacement rates.
Denotinq by ~a0 and ~ the initial and the final values, the
dynamics of the replacement rate can be described as
follows:
(4.7) ~t-p~t(~0-~) ~~t, where ~p-0.5, {i,~0.75 and r~y-0.8.
We are interested in the transition period, thus we
have to assume that the initial vector of cohort pensions
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(4.8) BO~~~---~ó---, where rg~0.99.
Finally, we assume that the minimum real pension is
increasing in time:
(4.9) bt~bpm~bt, where b0~0.45 and ~b~1.01.
Of course, our specifications are quite arbitrary, and
better analytic solutions might be found in the future.
In Figure 3 we report the simulation results with a
horizon of T-20 years. The paradox mentioned in the
Introduction can be observed. While the entry pension ís
only increasinq till t-11 and then sharply sinks, the
average pension is increasinq almost to the end and the
subsequent drop is mild. However, practically each
pensioner cohort experiencea a steady decline in its
relative (or real) benefit all over the yeara. The relative
dispersion of cohort pensions13 is gettinq stronger and
stronger with the passaqe of time, until (at t-10) the
minimum pension takes over, and equalizes most of the
pensions.
Finally we replace our 'descriptive' run with a
'prescriptive one': we introduce full indexation with
respect to wages but choose a less steeply increasing
replacement rate with WOz0.45, ~~0.7 and r„~~0.9. Figure 4
displays that the paradox cannot be eliminated, since the
effects of initial cohort inequalities and slower but still
growing replacement rate are felt even after 20 years. But
the inequalities are definitely weaker than before. Having
comparable average real pensions, at the peak both the
entry real pension and the relative dispersion are much
13 Note that in the dynamical setting it is no lonqer
acceptable to identify dispersion of a given year qroup's
pensions over time and dispersion of all cohort's pensions
in a given year. A pensioner is interested in the former,
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lower than they were oriqinally: b12,1~0.771~0.898 and
a[b12]~0.145~0.223, respectively.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Usinq this relatively simple cohort model and some SASIC
calculations, we were able to reproduce several
characteristics of the Hungarian pension system in its time
dimension. We have, however, neglected a good deal of other
important issues, either analyzed by others or not yet
discussed at all. Among the numerous open questions, I
would líke only to mention few.
The differences within cohorts are much larger than
between cohorts, concerning wages and pensions.
Nevertheless, due to the special structure of the Hungarian
pension indexation, we had to start our analysis with
inter-cohort analysis. In fact, using this framework we
were able to explain the paradox, namely, that - in real
terms - average pensions are increasing, but cohort (in
cross-section) and age group (longitudinally) pensions are
declining. In the next step, the analysis of inter-cohort
heterogeneity should be complemented by that of intra-
cohort inhomogeneity.l4
This paper aimed at description rather than
prescription. The proposal on introduction of full
indexation was the only normative conclusion. (In fact,
14 It is an interestinq equalitarian feature of the US
Social Security system that the replacement ratio is a
steeply decreasing function of the waqe: it is 0.9 for
those single earners who worked half time for minimum wage
but only 0.26 for those who had maximum taxable earnings.
For the average covered earninqs ~-0.46 which fs quite low.
(Note, however, that in the US the Social Security and
related transfers comprise a much smaller share of the
pensioners' incomes than in Hungary (Thompson, 1983).)21
this is now the official government policy, too, but it is
still dubious if it will be implemented.l5)
However, looking ahead, several questions should be
tackled. Let me mention just two: (i) Is it possible (at
least partially and without retroaction) to compensate
those whose pensions were debased by inflation and partial
indexation? (ii) Is it possible to combine a minimum state
pension system with a flexible private pension system
(Augusztinovics (1992) and Kornai (1992))? Let us hope that
the pension system of the next forty years would better
care for the elderly than the present one.1ó
15 Just in these days (May 1992) a new Polish budget
crisis developed, in part due to the excessive budqet
deficits caused by full pension indexation. This case also
underlines the importance of coordinatinq relative pension
index, replacement and contribution rates.
16 In the age of prewar nostalgia let me emphasize
that in prewar Hungary more than half of the population was
not covered at all by Social Securityl22
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